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Abstract 
Empirical applications of the Tullock contest model are rare, due in part to the non-
observability of effort. This paper presents an application of the standard Tullock model in a 
setting where effort can be observed and explained. A simple contest model is used to predict 
levels of effort in English soccer, with data on fouls and yellow and red cards used to reflect 
the effort of teams. Effort levels are found to be higher in matches between evenly balanced 
teams, and in matches with implications for end-of-season outcomes. The results suggest that 
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1.   Introduction 
Tullock’s (1980) contest model is a standard tool in economics. In a winner-take-all 
contest, the ex ante probability of winning depends positively on your effort and negatively 
on your opponent’s effort. Numerous papers have used the Tullock contest model to describe 
rent-seeking behavior or success in tournaments (e.g., Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Nitzan, 1991, 
1994). In general, however, the Tullock model does not predict whether effort is a strategic 
substitute or complement in the sense of Bulow et al. (1985); this depends upon the payoff 
structure. 
Empirical applications of the standard Tullock model are rare, due in part to the non-
observability of effort. For example, data on bribes and the transfer of intangible assets in 
rent-seeking contests may be unobtainable. However, team sports offer a potentially fruitful 
setting for testing the standard Tullock model with non-experimental data, since effort can be 
observed and explained. Jia (2006), for example, uses data from US professional basketball to 
show that match outcomes depend on the contributed effort of the teams (where effort is 
proxied with on-court salary data), but there is no attempt to explain equilibrium levels of 
effort.        
In this paper a simple Tullock contest model is used to predict levels of effort. The 
application is presented in the context of English professional soccer. In this setting, one 
important influence on the probability of winning a contest (apart from underlying team 
quality) is the contributed effort of the teams. By working hard to press the opposition and 
make tackles, teams will eventually commit fouls and receive yellow and red cards. 
Therefore, effort can be usefully measured by the numbers of fouls committed by the home 
and away teams, and the numbers of yellow and red cards awarded against each team.
1  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical 
model. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical model. Section 4 reports the empirical 
results; and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.   Theoretical Framework 
This section develops a standard contest model for soccer match outcomes. Before the 
match, each manager (coach) decides independently on the conduct of his team: specifically, 
whether the team will work hard to tackle (and press) players of the opposition. Effort is 
measured by a continuous variable  , where i=1, 2 denotes the home and away teams. 
Greater effort carries a cost, because it increases the probability that a player receives a 
caution (yellow card) or is dismissed (red card).
2 The marginal cost of effort, denoted c, is 
assumed to be constant and identical for all teams. 
i e
Both teams’ effort levels influence the probabilities for the match outcome. For 
simplicity, the theoretical model is developed by incorporating the following weighted sum of 
the home team’s win probability and the draw probability into the teams’ expected payoff 
functions: p(e1, e2)=prob(home win) +0.5prob(draw). p(e1, e2) is the home team’s success 
probability, and 1 – p(e1, e2) is the away team’s success probability.
3 
The teams are assumed to be heterogeneous in underlying quality, and an asymmetric 
contest model is required (Corchon, 2000). The teams’ prior success probabilities reflect the 
relative quality of the teams and home-field advantage, but they do not reflect the teams’ 
choices of e1 and e2. The absolute quality if team i, which is common knowledge before the 
match, is denoted βi. Home-field advantage, arising from the support the home team receives 
from the crowd and from any possible refereeing bias (Dawson et al., 2007), is represented by 
a parameter h. The home team’s prior success probability is    r = 
h
h
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The expected payoffs for teams 1 and 2 are 
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where Ui represents the gross payoff (before deducting the cost arising from greater effort) to 
team i from winning the match.
4 Ui depends on the importance of the match to team i. For 
example, Ui is large if team i is near the top of its divisional league table and in contention for 
the championship, qualification for European competition, or promotion to a higher division. 
Ui is also large if team i is near the bottom of its divisional table and in danger of relegation to 
the division below. Ui is small when team i is out of contention for any of these end-of-season 
outcomes. 
The absolute team quality measures β1 and β2 are determined by the quality of playing 
talents, the ability of the managers, and the teams’ tactical capabilities. All of these 
determinants may vary over time, even within a soccer season. Prior to each match, the team 
managers select e1 and e2 so as to maximize their teams’ expected payoffs. The non-
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=      (4) 
From (4), the equilibrium levels of effort decrease with the marginal cost of effort. 
From contest theory it is well known that the response of the strategic variable (the level of 
effort) to a small change in the payoffs depends upon the levels of the payoffs. The partial 
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Equivalent results can be derived for small changes in the away team’s win payoff. In (5), 
 is unambiguously positive. This leads to   1
*
1 / U e ∂ ∂
Result 1: An increase in the payoff from a win for either team will unambiguously 
increase that team’s level of effort.  
The effect of an increase in the payoff from a win on the other team’s level of effort is 
ambiguous. In (5),   is positive if  1
*
2 / U e ∂ ∂ 1 2 rU U ) r 1 ( > −  and negative if  1 2 rU U ) r 1 ( < − , 
where rU1 and (1 – r)U2 are the two teams’ expected prior payoffs.  
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Comparing (6) with (1) leads to 
Result 2: The home team’s equilibrium success probability is larger (smaller) than its 
prior success probability if the home team’s win payoff is larger (smaller) than the away 
team’s win payoff.  
  Finally, the values of r at which the teams’ levels of effort are maximized are derived 
from (4). The maximum value of e1 is obtained when r=U2/(U1+U2), and the maximum value 
of e2 is obtained when r=U1/(U1+U2). This leads to 
 Result  3:  If the teams’ payoffs from a win are the same, the teams’ effort levels are 
maximized when the match is evenly balanced after allowing for home-field advantage, in the 
sense that each team has a prior success probability of 0.5. If the teams’ payoffs from a win 
are unequal, the teams’  effort levels are maximized when the prior success probability of the 
team with the larger (smaller) payoff is below (above) 0.5.      
3.   Data and Empirical Model 
The data for the empirical analysis comprises all 12,216 matches played in the English 
Premier League (the Premiership) and the three divisions of the English Football League 
(currently known as the Championship, League One and League Two) during the six soccer 
seasons from 2001/02 to 2006/07 (inclusive). The data source is www.football-data.co.uk. 
The dependent variables in the empirical models are the numbers of fouls committed by each 
team per match, and the numbers of yellow and red cards awarded against each team per 
match.   
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics. The sample means for the numbers of fouls 
awarded against the home and away teams are 12.4 and 13.1 per match, respectively. 
Although the number of fouls per match takes the form of count data, the number of cells 
appears sufficiently large to justify treating these data as continuous. Accordingly, the fouls 
equations are estimated as Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). The interdependence 
between the fouls committed by the home and away teams is captured by the 
contemporaneous correlation between the disturbances of the home and away team equations.  
The sample means for the numbers of cards awarded against the home and away teams 
per match are 1.2687 and 1.6957 (yellow) and 0.0747 and 0.1198 (red), respectively. In this 
case the numbers of cells are small, necessitating the use of count data regression models. As 
Table 1 shows, the sample variances are similar to the sample means, which suggests that the 
Poisson distribution provides a suitable probability model. The yellow and red cards 
equations are estimated using a bivariate distribution obtained from the convolution of two 
univariate zero-inflated Poisson probability functions via the Frank copula (Lee, 1999).
5 The 
copula function contains a parameter that controls for interdependence between the cards 
awarded against the home and away teams. The bivariate cards regressions reported in Section 4 express the log-mean number of cards for each team as a linear function of 
covariates that are defined below. 
  According to the theoretical analysis developed in Section 2, the teams’ strategic 
choices for their levels of effort depend upon two factors: (i) differences between the payoffs 
from a win for each team; and (ii) the degree of balance or imbalance between the teams’ 
prior success probabilities. Controls are included for (i) and (ii), and for one further non-
strategic determinant of the levels of foul play: (iii) weaker teams that tend to spend more of 
the match defending are expected to commit more fouls and collect more cards than stronger 
teams that spend more time attacking.  
   In controlling for (i) above, it is assumed that the two teams’ payoffs from a win may 
differ once a stage of the season has been reached at which some teams have dropped out of 
contention for championship, European qualification, promotion or relegation outcomes. The 
0-1 dummy variable HSIG = 1 if the match is significant for end-of-season outcomes for the 
home team, and ASIG = 1 if the match is significant for the away team. The algorithm that 
determines whether the match is significant assesses whether it is arithmetically possible 
(before the match is played) for the team to win the championship, qualify for European 
competition, be promoted or be relegated, if all other teams currently in contention for the 
same outcome take one league point on average from each of their remaining fixtures.
6  
  In order to control for (ii) and (iii) above, relative team quality is measured using 
HPROB=prob(home win)+0.5×prob(draw). HPROB corresponds to the variable r, the home 
team’s prior success probability, in the theoretical model. A numerical value for HPROB for 
each of the N=12,216 sample matches is generated from the match results forecasting model 
described in full by Goddard (2005).
7 Included among the covariates of this model are HSIG 
and ASIG (as defined above), which control for the effect of incentives on the match result 
probabilities. In the present case, HPROB should reflect prior success probabilities, which depend upon the underlying quality of the two teams, but should not incorporate any 
incentives effects. Therefore in generating HPROB from the forecasting model, we reset the 
values of HSIG and ASIG to zero for the (out-of-sample) matches for which the forecasts are 
produced.      
A convenient measure of the competitiveness of the match, or uncertainty of match 
outcome, is UNCERT = HPROB×(1–HPROB). UNCERT is maximized when HPROB=0.5. 
A positive relationship is expected between UNCERT and the numbers of fouls and cards 
awarded. 
Finally, the estimations include controls for several other factors that might be 
expected to influence the number of fouls comitted and cards awarded. Individual soccer 
season dummy variables control for changes over time in the content and interpretation of the 
rules relating to foul play; referee fixed effects control for variation among referees in the 
propensity to award fouls and cards; and individual team fixed effects control for other 
unobservable differences between teams.
8  
 
4.   Empirical Results 
The estimation results are reported in Table 2. Column (1) reports the SUR 
estimations for the numbers of fouls committed, and columns (2) and (3) report maximum 
likelihood estimation results for the bivariate regressions for the numbers of cards awarded 
against the home and away teams.  
The coefficients on HSIG in all three equations are positively signed (as expected) but 
insignificant; while the coefficients on ASIG are positively signed (as expected) and 
significant at the 5% level or lower, using one-tail tests. Therefore we find some evidence to 
support the hypothesis developed in Section 2 that the teams’ strategies reflect the magnitudes 
of the payoffs. However, the tendency for effort to be lower when no end-of-season outcomes are at stake appears more pronounced when playing away from home than at home. A 
possible interpretation is that away teams tend to ‘ease off’ in unimportant end-of-season 
matches, but home teams, perhaps conscious of their own crowd’s critical scrutiny, feel 
obliged to demonstrate maximum commitment at all times. 
The coefficients on HPROB are negatively signed (as expected) in the equations for 
the home team, and positively signed (as expected) in the equtions for the away team. Two of 
the three coefficients on HPROB for the home team (in the fouls and the yellow cards 
equations) are significant at the 1% level, and all three coefficients on HPROB for the away 
team are significant (at the 1% level in the fouls equation, 5% level in the yellow cards 
equation, and 10% level in the red cards equation). These results indicate that weaker teams 
(as measured by the prior success probability) tend to commit more fouls and collect more 
cards than stronger teams. 
Finally, the coefficients on UNCERT are positively signed (as expected) in every case. 
Two of the three coefficients on UNCERT for the home team (in the fouls and the red cards 
equations) are significant at the 5% level or below, and all three coefficients on HPROB for 
the away team are significant at the 5% level or lower. These findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis, developed in Section 2, that effort levels tend to be higher in matches involving 
teams that are evenly balanced than in matches where there is a large disparity between the 
quality of the two teams.  
 
5.   Conclusion 
The Tullock contest model has been widely used in the contest theory literature. 
Although the standard Tullock model provides a number of testable predictions about the 
behavior of agents in winner-take-all contests, empirical applications have been rare. This 
paper has tested the implications of the Tullock model in a setting where effort can be observed and explained. Using data from English professional soccer, the effort of the teams 
is reflected in the numbers of fouls committed and the numbers of yellow and red cards 
awarded. The results show that effort levels tend to be higher in matches between evenly 
balanced teams, and away teams (in particular) tend to work harder to make tackles when 
end-of-season outcomes are at stake. The results suggest that the teams’ effort levels are 
strategic complements.   
 Notes 
1 Teams that make more (less) effort to tackle the opposition can expect to commit more 
(fewer) fouls and collect more (fewer) yellow and red cards than teams that make less (more) 
effort. A foul in soccer is an unfair act by a player against an opponent which is deemed by 
the referee to contravene Law 12 of the Laws of the Game. If the referee judges the foul play 
to be serious he may decide that it warrants a disciplinary sanction (yellow or red card) in 
accordance with Law 12. A yellow card is awarded for less serious transgressions. There is no 
further punishment within the match, unless the player commits a second similar offence, in 
which case a red card is awarded and the player is expelled for the rest of the match (with no 
replacement permitted). A red card, also known as a sending-off or dismissal, is awarded for 
more serious offences and results in immediate expulsion (again, with no replacement 
permitted).  
 
2 A red card leads to a suspension, preventing the player from appearing in either one, two or 
three of his team’s next scheduled matches. A player who accumulates five yellow cards in 
different matches within the same season also receives a suspension.  
 
3 This formulation ensures that the two teams’ success probabilities sum to one, and by so 
doing simplifies the algebra without any loss of generality. The weight attached to prob(home 
win) in the definition of p(e1,e2) is twice the weight attached to prob(draw). Therefore by 
assuming (below) that the teams’ expected gross utility payoffs from the match are obtained 
by multiplying the utility value of a win by p(e1,e2), it is assumed implicitly that the utility 
value of the draw is half the utility value of the win. In accordance with expected utility 
theory, under the league points system of three points for a win and one point for a draw, this 
set-up implies risk aversion on the part of team managers. Other weightings for the utility values of the win and the draw can be accommodated by the model without affecting 
fundamentally any of the results that are derived below, but at the cost of introducing some 
additional algebraic complexity. 
 
4 Payoffs are normalized such that a loss implies a zero gross payoff. 
 
5 The marginal probability function for zi = number of yellow or red cards awarded against the 
home team (i=1) and away team (i=2) is denoted fi(zi)=exp(–λi) /zi! for zi=0,1,2,... The joint 
distribution function is constructed by substituting the two univariate distribution functions, 
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, where ϕ is an ancillary parameter. The zero-
inflated joint probabilities are: (1–θ)P(z1,z2)+θD(z1,z2), where P(z1,z2) is the bivariate joint 
probability function corresponding to G[F1(z1),F2(z2)],  D(0,0)=1 and D(z1,z2)=0 for 
(z1,z2)≠(0,0), and θ  is an ancillary parameter. The zero-inflated adjustment allows the 
probabilities for the cell (z1=0,z2=0) to be larger than is suggested by the Poisson distribution: 
an empirical regularity that is evident in the current data. 
 
6 Alternative algorithms, based on different assumptions concerning the average performance 
of competing teams over their remaining fixtures, alter the classification of a small proportion 
of matches at the margins, but the implications for the estimation results are negligible. 
 
7 This model generates probabilities for home win, draw and away win outcomes, based 
solely on historical data that are available prior to the match in question. Full details are 
reported in Goddard (2005), and are not repeated here.  
8 The season dummies are Ss = 1 if the match is played in season s; 0 otherwise (s represents 
seasons 2002/03 to 2006/07 inclusive; 2001/02 is the reference category). The referee fixed 
effects are Rr = 1 if the match is officiated by referee r; 0 otherwise (r=1...106 represents 
referees who officiated at least 30 matches within the observation period; those referees who 
officiated fewer than 30 matches each form the reference category). The team fixed effects are 
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 Table 1:   Descriptive statistics, sample data 
 
Number of matches in which 
F fouls were awarded  
against: 
Number of matches in which 
Y yellow cards were awarded 
against: 
Number of matches in which 









Y  Home team  Away team 
 
Number of 
red cards, R 
Home team  Away team 
0-4 167  143 0 3535 2294 0  11353 10856 
5-9 2762  2203 1  4172 3644 1  817 1263 
10-14 5818  5561 2  2829 3287 2  43 92 
15-19 2924  3464 3  1184 1905 3  3 4 
20-24 503  778 4  389 754 4  0 1 
25+ 42  67 5+  107 332      
           
Total 12,216  12,216 Total 12,216 12,216 Total 12,216 12,216 
              
Mean  12.4007  13.1212 Mean 1.2687 1.6957 Mean 0.0747 0.1198 
St.  dev  3.9759  4.1345 Variance 1.2834 1.6706 Variance 0.0776 0.1234 
 
 
 Table 2:   Estimation results  
 
         Dependent variable → 
↓ Independent variables  
Home team:  
Fouls  


























         Dependent variable → 
↓ Independent variables  
Away team:  
Fouls  


































The fouls equations are estimated as Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). The yellow and 
red cards equations are estimated as a bivariate Poisson regression. Ancilliary parameters 
(allowing for interdependence between the home team and away team fouls or cards, and the 
zero-inflation parameter) are not reported.  
Additional controls included in these regressions are individual effects for (i) soccer seasons, 
(ii) teams and (iii) referees. Coefficients are not reported. 
*,
**,
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